The Eurozone crisis challenges the scrutiny systems of national parliaments: many instruments tackling the crisis were established outside the EU legal framework; the crisis management has generally been dominated by European and national executives and shows that the crisis did play an important role with regard to plenary EU debates in many national parliaments. Beyond debates, however, the scrutiny of the crisis management has surprisingly been 'business as usual' for most parliamentary chambers. This further cements the gap between formally strong and active and formally weak and inactive parliaments.
Introduction
Since the beginning of the European integration process, national parliaments have had a bumpy ride. For many years, European integration appeared mainly as a threat to national 2 parliaments, given that they were seen to be losing legislative authority to the European level.
However, over time many of the 'poor losers' of integration have learned 'to fight back' and obtained stronger participation rights in the domestic handling of European policy (Winzen 2012) . 1 Since the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty national parliaments even have an explicit role within the EU's legislative process, in particular as the new guardians of the subsidiarity principle.
However, it seems that the challenges national parliaments face have reached a new level within the context of the eurozone crisis and the resulting changes in the economic governance of the EU: Crisis management 'by summit' (Schulz, 2012) has become the norm;
intergovernmental treaties outside the EU legal framework weaken parliamentary participation rights; strict austerity measures, financial guarantees, closer economic policy coordination and enforced budgetary discipline all impact core areas of parliamentary authority. What we know far less about is how parliaments have accompanied the management of the crisis. Are backbenchers still 'fighting back' or were they marginalized by a highly technocratic, executive-dominated crisis management? Much of the literature and political commentaries seem to suggest the latter (e.g. Fox, 2012 , Landfried, 2012 , Münkler, 2012 . A severe lack of basic parliamentary involvement would, however, not only make it more difficult for member states to take national 'ownership' of the crisis management, but also challenge the advances made in terms of the democratic legitimacy of the EU. Auel, 2014) .
The aim of this short contribution is thus a humble one: to investigate how national parliaments have accompanied the crisis management by providing a comparative overview over their crisis-related scrutiny activities. As the data does not allow us to compare the activities of national parliaments to the period before 2010, we are unable to analyze whether the crisis has had a more general impact on parliamentary scrutiny. Given the constraints in terms of space, we also have to leave more systematic explanations for the variation in the level of activities to future publications.
Economic Governance Reform and its Impact on National Parliaments
In early 2010, the sovereign debt crisis hit the EU. (Wessels and Rozenberg, 2013) . Some of the most far reaching instruments that they initiated -such as the EFSF, the ESM or the Fiscal Compact -are also based on intergovernmental agreements or treaties outside the EU legal framework. As a result, national governments treated (or tried to treat) the latter as foreign rather than EU policy, which generally limits parliaments' involvement.
So far we know little about how national parliaments reacted to the challenges described 
Dealing With the Crisis: Business as usual?
For the purpose of this paper, we draw on comparative empirical data on parliamentary activities in EU affairs between 2010 and 2012 across all 27 national parliaments (Auel et al., 2014 file, and the data was checked both during the coding process and ex post by two supervisors individually to ensure accuracy. In addition, a questionnaire sent to national parliaments provided data on the average length of EU plenary debates and the overall time spent on all plenary. After a third reminder, the return rate was 100 per cent, although some specific data was missing in a few cases. Missing data was added through the authors' own calculations.
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A few shortcomings and caveats of the data collection need to be mentioned. Still, as table 1 shows, the eurozone crisis impacted significantly on parliamentary activities.
In the period under investigation national parliaments spent almost one thousand hours debating crisis-related issues in over 450 plenary debates and issued nearly 440 mandates or resolutions on this topic. In contrast, reasoned opinions (Early Warning System) were rarely submitted on crisis-related legislative proposals. Despite the fact that many crisis instruments have a direct impact on core parliamentary competencies, national parliaments rarely expressed concerns about questions of subsidiarity.
[ , added up to an overall score and divided by three.
A first result is that we find a strong correlation between the level of activity related to the crisis and the level of activity in other EU policy areas (Figure 1 ).
[ Figure 1 about here]
Overall, it seems, the crisis has neither significantly increased nor limited the use of parliamentary instruments in EU matters. At least when it comes to their overall level of engagement, the crisis is mainly 'business as usual' for national parliaments. Parliaments showing high levels of activities in EU affairs do also show high levels in the crisis management -independent of the fact whether they adopted the common currency or had been hit significantly by the crisis.
[ Table 2 about here]
However, as table 2 shows, the crisis had a very different impact on specific parliamentary activities. The share of resolutions/mandates and opinions is similar -and comparatively low 4
Mandates/resolutions: absolute number; debates: combined indicator measuring the absolute number of EU debates and their share out of the overall debating time spent in the plenary to account for the variation in general plenary activity (for further details see Auel et al, 2014) . We decided against weighing the different types of activities since the consideration whether one type of activity is more important than others (and, in quantitative terms, exactly how much more important) is a normative question. The low number of reasoned opinions (EWS) on crisis matters does not allow drawing any substantial conclusions other that national parliaments were either not very concerned about subsidiarity issues or at least did not think it opportune to voice such concerns publicly. Similar, the number of political Dialogue opinions on crisis documents, of which over 40 per cent (38) were submitted by the Portuguese Assembleia, is too low for a meaningful comparison.
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EU debates dealt with the eurozone crisis; in 11 parliaments, even 50 per cent and more of all EU debates were related to the crisis.
[ Figure 3 about here]
Interestingly -with the exception of the Czech parliament -especially the countries that will adopt the common currency in the near future are those with the lowest share of crisis-related debates (Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia 8 , Lithuania, Poland, Romania).
The scatterplot in figure 4 further supports the findings: Eurozone membership has little impact on the mandating activity, but in all non-eurozone members (striped markers) -with the slight exception of the UK -plenary debates concerning crisis-related issues play a far smaller role than in parliaments of eurozone members -and this is especially the case for those where membership is planned.
[ Figure 4 about here]
Also striking are the differences between debtor and donor parliaments within the eurozone.
Neither Greece, Ireland nor Portugal (indicated by the circular striped markers) are very active in trying to influence their government by issuing resolutions on crisis issues. And while they do debate crisis issues more regularly than many of the non-eurozone parliaments, they remain well below average as well. Together with Cyprus and Spain (two member states that became debtors in late 2012 and early 2013, respectively), they are among the least active when it comes to the crisis. It can, of course, be argued that these parliaments have fewer incentives to scrutinize the EU crisis management due to both, internal pressures to deal with their fiscal problems as well as, especially, external pressures emanating from the EU level to accept conditions for financial support. The only exception is the Irish parliament. Although the reform of its scrutiny procedures in in June 2011 was not triggered by the crisis as such, the Dáil Éireann has since made regular use of its right to debate, for example, statements of the Taoiseach on formal and informal European Council meetings as well as Euro Area
Summits (see also Wessels and Rozenberg, 2013) .
Discussion and Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to provide empirical evidence on how parliaments reacted to the challenges of the Eurozone crisis. A first important finding is that national parliaments have not generally been stunned into inertia, but dealt with the crisis similarly to how they deal with other EU affairs. This questions, at least to some extent, the assumption that the specific conditions of the crisis and the crisis management (executive dominance, time pressure, agreements outside of the Treaties and claims of 'no alternative') generally marginalized national parliaments or made parliamentary scrutiny too difficult. One explanation is that the crisis measures also included a sizeable number of EU directives and regulations that national parliaments deal with through their usual scrutiny procedures. Many parliaments have developed institutional routines -for instance the involvement of the specialized standing committees -which facilitate the scrutiny of crisis-related issues. Yet despite a general increase in parliamentary scrutiny rights over the last years (Winzen, 2012) , a number of parliaments are still generally inactive in EU matters, and this is especially the case for some of the programme countries.
Second, although the overall activity level in the crisis is similar to that in other EU affairs, debates played a prominent role. Since the data does not allow a comparison to parliamentary activities before 2010, we cannot draw conclusions on whether parliaments have indeed become more active when it comes to debating EU issues due to the crisis, or whether the crisis has simply been the dominant topic among EU debates. Some studies, however, do indicate that the crisis has led to a greater politicization of EU issues within national parliaments (Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra, 2013; Wendler, 2014 Non-eurozone countries -and especially those preparing to enter the Eurozone -debate the crisis less often. Given that a majority of their citizens are rather critical of the prospect of adopting the euro (Eurobarometer, 2013) , these parliaments seem to prefer keeping the giant sedated by not publicly debating potential dangers and challenges related to the adoption of the common currency.
Due to space limitations, this short contribution did not attempt to explain variation in the level of parliamentary activity more systematically. Institutional capacities in EU affairs, political factors (i.e. Eurosceptical parties in parliament) but also specific macro-economic factors are likely to influence parliamentary activities related to the crisis. We will explore such explanations in a future publication. But the fact remains that there is still a large gap between the strongest and most active parliaments in the EU and the weakest, least active. It is this gap, firmly cemented by the crisis, which is the greatest challenge to parliamentary legitimacy in the EU. 
